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FOREWORD
The past three years have been enormously active ones in the field of securities
regulation. This period has seen the introduction of a major legislative program,
the completion of the Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets (called "the
most ambitious and comprehensive study since the passage of the securities acts
thirty years ago"), publication of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce's
A Study of Mutual Funds, and a stream of landmark Commission and court de-
cisions. In recognition of the great activity in the field, Law and Contemporary
Problems decided to devote its Summer 1964 issue to a symposium on "Securities
Regulation." A number of articles in this symposium touch on two developments
whose impact on the structure of the capital market has been and will probably
continue to be major. The first development relates to the fashioning of standards
of conduct for the broker-dealer community which are consonant with the image
of professionalism which that community has tried to project. The second develop-
meat relates to the growing importance in the equity markets of the institutional
investor. I would like to raise and briefly discuss some of the questions posed by
these developments.
A prime concern of the Securities Act of 1933 is the sale to the public of securities
by companies which need new money. Unlike the approach of some state laws, the
Securities Act does not erect any standards by which the investment merits of such
securities can be judged-and by which those failing to meet the standards can be
barred from the capital market. The theory of the Securities Act is that if investors
are provided with sufficient information to permit them to make a reasoned decision
concerning the investment merits of securities offered to them, investor interests can
be adequately protected without unduly restricting the ability of business ventures
to raise capital. The primary responsibility for providing such information is placed
on the company issuing the shares which are to be sold. Thus, thinking about the
distribution of securities to the public has traditionally focused on the preparation and
dissemination of the prospectus-the document which contains the basic information
an investor should have. One of the important contributions of the Special Study
was the emphasis it placed on the importance of point of contact selling in the
distribution of securities to the public. The Special Study underscored what many
people knew: That individual investors frequently did not use the prospectus as a
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in equity purchases to their portfolios. Nowhere has the growth of the institutional
investor been more dramatically shown than in the field of corporate pension plans.
In 1949 they held $5oo million in stocks. Their present holdings of $2I.7 billion
in stock represent an increase of over 4,ooo per cent. Mutual fund assets (most of
which are invested in equity securities) increased roughly eight times during the
same period. These figures contrast sharply with the Special Study's report that in
the eleven-year period i95i-6i, individuals, together with personal trust funds and
non-profit organizations, were net sellers of stock (excluding investment company
shares) in the amount of $4oo million. The Special Study also pointed out that
between 1951 and 1961 the net acquisition by institutions (excluding personal trusts
and non-profit organizations) of equity securities slightly exceeded the total amount
of corporate stock (excluding investment company stock) issued during this period.
One of the characteristics of institutional investing noted by the Special Study is
the tendency for holdings to be concentrated in relatively few securities-primarily in
the securities of seasoned enterprises.
It is by no means clear what impact the institutional investor will have on the
structure of the equity market. However, a few observations can be made. There
is an increasing tendency for institutional investors (particularly institutions other
than investment companies) to negotiate their purchases and sales in the over-the.
counter market where they can avoid the minimum commission rate structure of
the exchanges. In addition, the tendency to deal in large blocks of stock imposes
strains on the existing specialist system. Institutional investors (particularly when
investment companies are excluded) tend to have turnover rates lower than that
experienced for all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange and, thereby,
may eventually contribute to a thinning of the market in certain issues. Moreover,
competition among various institutions for a limited number of stocks may be
pushing the price of those stocks (and correspondingly lowering their yield) beyond
the point where they will remain attractive to individual investors.
The discernible shift from direct investment by individuals in the equity market
to indirect investment through financial institutions (a trend which probably will
deepen because of the ability of such institutions through promotional campaigns and
large, aggressive sales forces to tap public savings) should theoretically be a boon
to the economy. Since financial institutions usually command the services of skilled
financial counsel, they should be able to invest the money entrusted to them in the
economically most promising enterprises. However, there does not seem to be
any clear evidence of the over-all validity of that theory. Indeed, one of the special
problems concerning institutional investors is their unwillingness to consider invest-
ment in smaller and more speculative enterprises.
To the extent that individuals invest in corporate securities through the medium
of financial institutions rather than directly, their participation in corporate affairs
becomes increasingly attenuated. On the other hand, corporate management be-
comes responsible to a smaller and more sophisticated group of persons. One of the
Foiwon
questions which grows out of this development is the extent to which the man-
agement of the financial institution has a right (or responsibility) to utilize the
combined economic power it represents to influence the management of its port-
folio companies. Moreover, the concentration of economic power in relatively few
hands suggests the need to focus on the public responsibilities which the managers
of these financial institutions acquire. Traditional corporate concepts concerning
the duties of officers and directors to their corporations and shareholders may not
be adequate.
One of the disturbing aspects of the growing importance of financial institutions
in the equity markets is the paucity of informed discussion of some of the major
problems connected with this development. To some extent such discussion may
be inhibited by the inability to secure necessary information. For example, since
only investment companies and insurance companies are generally required to make
periodic, detailed disclosures of their portfolio holdings, it is impossible to get
precise information concerning the portfolio holdings of financial institutions. Often
there seems to be an unwillingness (for one reason or another) to grapple with
what are tough questions. For example, when the Comptroller of the Currency
expanded the regulations governing the activities of bank commingled funds to
permit them "to compete more effectively with mutual funds and other investment
companies," there was very little public discussion of the desirability of permitting
banks to enter this aspect of the securities business. The problem which received
public attention was whether the banks had to adhere to "mutual fund ground
rules" when they went "the mutual fund way." The proposed legislative solution
to the problem, the Bank Collective Investment Fund Act of 1963, sought to exempt
interests in bank commingled funds from the application of the federal securities
laws. It did so by stating that these interests did not constitute securities; and, thus,
tried to obscure the important question of the extent to which banks should, in the
light of the type of policy considerations underlying the Glass-Steagall Act, operate
such funds.
Effective regulation requires an awareness that the activity subject to regulation
is not static. Certainly, as the articles in this symposium make clear, the securities
business has not remained static in the past thirty years. One of the important
achievements of the Securities and Exchange Commission during William L. Cary's
chairmanship has been its evident concern to find out what changes had occurred
in the securities business and what changes were likely to occur and then to furnish
appropriate regulatory responses. In his article, "Administrative Agencies and the
Securities and Exchange Commission," Mr. Cary indicates that carrying out what
he termed the program of rethinking problems of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission was not an easy one in light of the numerous forces which tend to make an
agency confine its goals solely to the "conduct [of] its day-to-day work honestly and
thoroughly without getting into any trouble." When an agency departs from the
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"dusty road" and travels the broad boulevard of future development, it should be
able to count on the academic community for companionship. In an effort to help
provide some additional insights into the problems which the Commission is re-
thinking, the Duke University School of Law is sponsoring on November 6 and 7,
1964 a conference of lawyers, businessmen and academicians at which the questions
raised in this Foreword will be discussed in depth.
ROBERT H. MuNxmiHi.
